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Abstract 
In this paper we challenge the notion of ‘normativity’ used by 
some enactive approaches to cognition. We define some 
varieties of enactivism and their assumptions and make explicit 
the reasoning behind the co-emergence of individuality and 
normativity. Then we argue that appealing to dispositions for 
explaining some living processes can be more illuminating than 
claiming that all such processes are normative. For this 
purpose, we will present some considerations, inspired by 
Wittgenstein, regarding norm-establishing and norm-following 
and show that attributions of normativity to non-social agents 
are deeply paradoxical. The main conclusions of our discussion 
are: (1) circular and internal explanations centred on the 
stability of living systems are insufficient to account for 
processes where the environment plays an important role, such 
as adaptation. Enactivism is not an explanatory alternative to 
evolutionary biology but needs it as a complement to accounts 
focused on the internal self-assembly of organisms; (2) though 
we share enactivism’s anti-representational spirit, we argue that 
ecological psychology can offer a better account of perception. 
 
Enactivism’s natural norms 
 
Enactivism is often presented as the new paradigm for 
explaining cognition (Stewart et al., 2010). It is based on the 
assumption that cognition, rather than being a matter of 
abstract calculus and manipulation of internal representations 
in the head, is a spatio-temporally extended and dynamical 
process in which an embodied agent is meaningfully dealing 
with its environment in order to adapt itself to it. But this is 
not enough for defining enactivism. In fact, all these 
assumptions and tools have already been endorsed and 
developed by other anti-cognitivist theories, such as 
ecological psychology (Gibson, 1966, 1979). So, what's new 
about enactivism? For some enactivists (Di Paolo, 2009) their 
theory provides a definition of agency in which the new 
embodied, extended and anti-representational cognitive 
science can rely on. Enactivism was born as a biological 
theory that emphasized the continuity between life and mind 
(Canguilhem, 1965; Maturana and Varela, 1987). Among the 
impressive achievements of the theory, perhaps the most 
important was the change of focus in thinking about living 
creatures: these are not seen as mere compounds of parts 
selected by evolution, but as whole agents individuated from 
their environment in terms of their internal structure. This 
structure or system is based on different networked processes 
(such as metabolism and the different processes of the nervous 
system, for example) and it is taken as a unity. This is to say 
that the system as a whole provides stability, and the 
processes of this system that result from its stable 
configuration are intended to keep this unity going. An agent, 
thus, is autonomous or self-sustained, and its goal is to keep 
this self-stability. This is the sense in which life is normative, 
according to enactivism. Although this idea was already being 
embraced by some philosophers (Canguilhem, 1965; Jonas, 
1966) only the explicit analysis due to Maturana and Varela 
made it into a suitable starting point for thinking about 
cognition. Cognition is one species in the wider genus of 
adaptive processes. Adaptive processes come in the form of a 
coupling typically described in mathematical terms; 
something that has been called the ‘agent-environment 
coupling’. In the context of perceptual processes, which are a 
special kind of adaptation, this coupling is called the 
‘sensorimotor loop’. A refined notion of adaptation (in the 
first, broader sense) was developed later in the enactivist 
framework for clarifying how all these concepts are 
interrelated (Di Paolo, 2005).  
Given the former definitions, we can broadly distinguish 
between two varieties of enactivism. First, those that endorse 
the biological notion of agency as a self-sustaining system 
along with the idea that perception is based on a sensorimotor 
loop. Second, those that are only committed to this way of 
explaining perception and do not hold to the theory of 
biological agency that defines the first group. Among the 
latter authors we can find Noë (2005) and O’Regan (2012). 
Conversely, among the former theoreticians we can find 
Maturana and Varela (1987), Jonas (1966) and others. We will 
focus on the notion of ‘normativity’ provided by the latter 
group, and for this purpose we will analyze the most recent 
definition of this phenomenon: the one provided by 
Barandiaran et al. (2009).  
This approach to normativity is given in terms of its co-
emergence with individuality and action, and these three 
notions work as different conditions for agency. Also, this 
agency is at the service of the autonomy of the system. So, 
given the fact that living systems are autonomous or self-
sustained, for enactive philosophers a prior assumption is 
required in order to understand how agency emerges. For the 
enactivists, the difference between machines and living beings 
is that for machines “no intrinsic force or process is lumping 
the components together, nor has the system as a whole 
(independently of us) a specific way of functioning and 
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demarcating itself from the rest” (Barandiaran et al., 2009; 
emphasis added). The individuality of the entity is not 
projected but recognized when we deal with living beings. 
The entity itself displays to us its own criterion of 
demarcation from the environment: an agent is then “a system 
capable of defining its own identity as an individual and thus 
distinguishing itself from its surroundings; in doing so, it 
defines an environment in which it carries out its actions” 
(Barandiaran et al., 2009, p. 3; the quotation appears in italics 
in the original).  
But a question remains unanswered: what is the particular 
process (or force, as it is quoted above) that allows for this 
demarcation? The answer is nothing but its own actions: 
“agents define themselves as individuals as an ongoing 
endeavor and through the actions they generate” (Barandiaran 
et al., 2009, p. 3, emphasis added). So, agents, by means of 
their acting, demarcate themselves as independent entities — 
and in doing so, they define themselves and also define the 
environment in terms of exclusion. 
Here we arrive at a crucial point: if the definition of 
individuality comes by means the agent’s actions, how do we 
differentiate mere random movements from genuine actions? 
When we talk of an action-perception loop in order to 
describe the interaction of the agent with the environment we 
cannot consider that both parts are equally active in the 
interaction. The coupling of a leaf flowing in the air 
establishes a symmetrical relation: the weight of the leaf and 
the force of the wind regulate the process with the same 
degree of implication. As we have seen, living beings are 
different: they act upon the environment and thus they can be 
demarcated from it. This is an asymmetrical relation. Agents 
and environments do not play the same role in the coupling. 
Hence the sensorimotor loop (or any other coupling) is not 
like the leaf-air coupling: it is something provoked by the 
agent. Actions are not random because the agent tries to 
achieve a certain goal with them. An action is a goal-directed, 
normative movement. That purposiveness demarcates actions 
from other movements. Thus, “agents have goals or norms 
according to which they are acting, providing a sort of 
reference condition, so that the interactive modulation is 
carried out in relation to this condition” (Barandiaran et al., 
2009; emphasis added). The statement quoted above is highly 
revealing: goals and norms are used interchangeably 
(Barandiaran et al., 2009, p. 5, footnote 2), and these norms 
are the reference condition by which we can say that agents 
are acting. Furthermore, the coupling with the environment is 
carried out in relation to this normative character that specifies 
the kind of interactions with the environment that are defined 
as ‘actions’.  
But what is a ‘norm’ from this enactive perspective? Is it a 
statement or an explicit rule like ‘the queen can move any 
number of vacant squares horizontally, diagonally or 
vertically’ or ‘do not feed the animals’? Clearly not. First, no 
linguistic competence is necessarily involved in the 
employment of this kind of norm, and nor is interaction with 
other agents required. Rather, it seems that some process is 
normative when it establishes and maintains the individuality 
or self-sustenance of the system: “self production is a process 
that defines a unity and a norm: to keep the unity going and 
distinct” (Di Paolo, 2005, p. 434; emphasis added). A process 
that benefits adaptation is a “norm given by self construction” 
(Di Paolo, 2009, p. 50).   
Now we have the whole picture of enactivist agency: agents 
are systems that individuate themselves from the environment 
by means of their actions, and those actions are described 
normatively. We can talk of a co-emergence of individuality 
and normativity: even though enactivists separate these as 
different conditions, they also explain in what sense the two 
concepts are co-extensive or interrelated. It can be useful to 
briefly return to the quotes cited above: “agents define 
themselves as individuals as an ongoing endeavor and through 
the actions they generate” and “agents have goals or norms 
according to which they are acting”. This amounts to saying 
that individuality is defined in terms of action and action is 
defined in terms of normativity. So, it is this “deep circularity 
and entanglement between networked processes, the self-
maintaining conditions they generate and the interactions that 
the system establishes with the environment what [sic] makes 
agents so challenging to model and understand” (Barandiaran 
et al., 2009. p. 8; emphasis added). Recently, Barandiaran and 
Egbert (in press) modeled the normative behaviour of a 
unicellular agent based on these criteria. In their model they 
differentiated between derived and intrinsic normativity, and 
they claim that the latter is a central feature of living beings, 
which are able to establish and follow their own norms in 
order to keep up the self-sustainability of their structure and 
their ability to adapt to their environments. That is why, for 
these authors, enactivism is a new paradigm: because it 
establishes a theory of agency through which we can 
understand cognition and, specifically, the normative aspect of 
it. 
Dispositions and norms 
The first set of examples that could clarify the notion of 
‘normativity’ defined by enactivism comes from the 
philosophical discussion of dispositions. Several authors have 
previously appealed to dispositions in order to explain the 
behaviour of physical objects but also of biological or rational 
agents (Ryle, 1949; Molnar, 2004; Mumford and Anjum, 
2011). We say that sugar has the disposition to dissolve when 
put into water, neurons have the disposition to open their 
sodium channels when they receive a stimuli, and humans 
have the disposition to laugh when they listen to a joke. For 
some authors, these dispositional properties are defined as 
intrinsic, first-order, and real properties of agents and objects 
(Molnar, 2009).  By ‘first-order’ we mean that dispositions are 
properties instantiated in individuals. The claim is that these 
dispositional properties are intrinsic to their bearers because 
they do not depend on the existence of any other object. Given 
these features, we can say for example that the fragility of a 
piece of glass is a property instantiated in a particular item, 
and also that the existence of that property does not depend on 
the existence of any object other than the piece of glass. The 
realist commitment to the property comes with the conclusion 
that, given its individuality and intrinsicality, a disposition 
does not need to manifest itself in order to prove it existence. 
Glass can maintain the property of being fragile even when it 
never breaks. We do not need the continuous manifestation of 
a dispositional property in order to assume its existence. 
Based on this, a special feature of dispositions is their 
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directedness: dispositions are directed to their reciprocal 
dispositional partners rather than to their manifestations. 
These reciprocal partners are other elements of the same kind 
that, given the right circumstances, play the role of triggering 
the manifestation of the property. For example, imagine a 
sugar cube: a sugar cube has the property of being soluble 
even when it is not able to show its solubility (let’s say, even 
when it is covered by plastic wrap while submerged in a glass 
of water). In this case, the disposition exists even when it is 
not manifested. Also, following Martin (2008), we can 
imagine that some chemical product A has the property of 
being soluble when mixed with another chemical product B 
even if product B does not exist in the universe (e.g., product 
B has never been synthesized because it would be too 
expensive to do so). In any event, our realist intuitions 
towards dispositions incline us to consider that the product A 
has the property of solubility even if it will never be 
manifested.  
An interesting feature of dispositions is that, applied to 
biological agents, they cover abilities and natural reactions as 
well as learned and innate responses. We can say that a dog 
once had the disposition to growl when the master picked up 
its bowl, but now it has the disposition to sit down when the 
master does the same thing. Also, given all the features 
mentioned above, dispositions can be useful for explaining 
interaction with the environment in a non-representational 
way: from a dispositional perspective, the basic unit of 
analysis is not the agent, but the agent-environment coalition. 
Dispositions, thus, explain the expected behaviours of certain 
agents under specific conditions.  
Given this account of dispositions, we think that these 
properties are very useful for explaining different processes 
and behaviours of living agents, which are highly context-
dependent. Thus, we are going to provide an example by 
which we can differentiate between a dispositional state and a 
normative behaviour: this will help us to show how the 
difference between following a rule and manifesting a 
disposition is blurred in the enactive account of perception. 
We will conclude that the subsumption of the dispositional 
within the normative is not helpful for explaining the different 
cognitive states of living agents. Imagine this situation: 
Manolo is a heavy smoker. To say that someone is a smoker is 
to make a dispositional attribution. Manolo is a smoker even 
when he isn’t smoking. Being a smoker is being disposed to 
smoke a cigarette in certain circumstances (being a heavy 
smoker is to be so disposed in most circumstances). For 
instance, Manolo has the disposition to light a cigarette every 
time he sees one, as if an internal force pushed him to do it. 
One day Manolo goes to the doctor and he is told that if he 
continues to smoke, he is very likely to develop a chronic 
respiratory disease. He realizes that he must stop smoking. 
This realization did not cancel his disposition to smoke, at 
least not in the short term. Nevertheless, it did stop him from 
manifesting the disposition. What was it that stopped a deep-
seated disposition from manifesting itself? The answer is 
clear: a norm. A norm can inhibit the triggering of certain 
dispositions even when the circumstances are otherwise 
entirely suitable for the disposition to manifest itself. From 
this perspective, a norm can inhibit but it can also eliminate a 
disposition after a certain number of corrections. So, the first 
difference between a disposition and a norm is that the first is 
intrinsic and internal, but the second is not. This is why the 
internal force persists even when the agent follows a rule 
imposed by another agent (such as the smoker and the doctor). 
Given these features we can understand now why a norm, 
then, is different from a disposition. It is clear when we look 
at examples involving humans, but can this notion of ‘norm’ 
be applied to neurons or bacteria? It seems that there is no 
room for this conceptual tool in the explanation of the 
behaviour of unicellular agents. Who can correct the cell for 
not behaving in a certain way? How can an intrinsic 
disposition of a bacterium be inhibited by a norm, if the only 
dispositions that we can find in bacteria are those that allow 
for its survival (or, at least, that allowed for the survival of its 
ancestors)? It seems that there is something in the context of 
bacteria that is missing if we want to apply the concept of 
‘norm’ to them. 
Wittgensteinian norms 
As we’ve seen, enactivists do not differentiate between 
biological dispositions and norms, and they label all these 
different processes ‘normative’. This would be a minor 
problem if it were only a terminological issue. However, we 
think that the problem is also conceptual and ontological: 
what we have here is a disagreement regarding what a norm 
is, how the concept works and in which context it can be 
applied. We have seen that some enactivists claim that a 
solitary agent can both establish and follow its own norm. 
Now the question is whether that claim is acceptable. Is it 
intelligible to think of an agent who is able to establish and 
follow its own rules in isolation? 
We think that Wittgenstein’s discussion on rule-following 
is still very relevant to this question. In the well-known 
sections of his Philosophical Investigations devoted to this 
issue, he offers a battery of arguments to show that the answer 
should be negative (Wittgenstein, 1953, §§ 185-242). When 
we talk of following and establishing our own norm we are 
talking of establishing and following a special course of 
action. Wittgenstein wants us to imagine a situation in which 
somebody is teaching a pupil to count in a certain way and the 
teacher wonders why, after many repetitions, the student is 
still not doing it correctly. The first explanation of the 
student’s behaviour is always to appeal to his natural 
reactions, to his natural inclinations, for answering one way 
rather than another. This suggests that we can distinguish 
between acting according to one’s natural dispositions and 
acting correctly — acting according to a rule. So, following a 
rule seems to be something much more complex than 
naturally reacting. If all there is to following a rule was to act 
according to one’s brute inclinations, then there would be no 
situation where learning could be thought to be necessary to 
coming to act in the right way.   
If equating norm-following with acting according to one’s 
unlearned natural dispositions is problematic, perhaps the 
enactivist, in her defense of the idea of biological norms, 
could appeal to the notion of interpretation. A sphere would 
be normative inasmuch as its inhabitants were capable of 
interpreting norms in such a way that their action was a case 
of following the rule under their interpretation. When 
discussing whether acting according to a norm can be 
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understood as offering an interpretation such that the action 
becomes subsumable by the rule, Wittgenstein comes back to 
the example of the pupil learning mathematics. After some 
successful exercises that seemed to show that he had mastered 
the use of the “+” sign (all involving numbers smaller than 
1000), the teacher asks him “how much is 1000 + 2?” The 
student answers “1004”. When the teacher tells him that this is 
not the right answer, he defends himself claiming that he is 
doing exactly what he was told: “I did as before. Wasn’t the 
rule: add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on?” 
The student has managed to provide an interpretation of the 
rule behind the use of the “+” sign that covers all possible 
uses of the sign and is consistent with all of the examples he 
was exposed to during his learning. It is tempting to say that 
the pupil can act in accordance with his own criterion. At the 
very least, he seems to show a personal and systematic way to 
face stimuli after a number of repetitions and encounters with 
them. A defender of the idea of non-social, natural norms 
would argue that the habitual answer to the stimulus can 
become a norm (i.e., a well-established causal connection). In 
fact, on what else would the rule-following of an isolated 
agent depend than on its personal interpretation of the norm 
(i.e., on its own systematic way of reacting to a given 
stumuli)? 
This way of understanding normativity seems deeply 
paradoxical: if acting according to a rule is no more than 
interpreting the rule in such a way that the action falls under 
it, then every action can be made out to accord with some 
interpretation of the rule and every action can also be made to 
conflict with an interpretation of the rule. Then there would be 
neither accord nor conflict here. If every idiosyncratic 
interpretation of the rule is right, then how we could say that 
somebody is wrong? It would seem that the concepts ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’, which are tightly connected to the concept of ‘norm’, 
are of no use here. So, if everything is a norm, then nothing is 
a norm at all because nobody could distinguish what is 
normative from what is not.  As Wittgenstein claims in § 201: 
“What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule 
which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what 
we call ‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going against it’ in actual 
cases.”  
Our claim in this paper is that the idea of a bacterium 
establishing and following norms is just as problematic as the 
idea that all there is to grasping a rule is to behave in a way 
that coheres with some possible interpretation of the rule. To 
talk about norms is to talk about the possibility of being right 
and wrong, and this in turns demands that the agent be 
capable of distinguishing between “it is correct” and “it seems 
correct to me”. Could anyone make such a distinction without 
having being corrected in the past? We believe not. Given the 
fact that the aspirant to being a rule-follower cannot be its 
own corrector, we claim that rule-establishing and rule-
following need to be defined as a socially-mediated 
phenomenon. Norms can only emerge within a social context; 
norms are, then, social institutions. Norm-establishing is a 
social process. That is precisely why norms are external: 
because the criteria of correctness are shared across a 
community of agents.  
The alternative, solipsistic conception of rule following 
makes following a rule analogous to speaking a private 
language (i.e., to following private, internal linguistic norms). 
Norms must be guided by certain criteria that determine the 
correctness of their own applicability. These criteria are 
external in the sense that a single agent acting alone cannot 
establish them: if that were the case, senseless situations like 
the one discussed above would be common. But why is that 
situation ‘senseless’? Because if somebody follows a rule and 
she cannot distinguish between following it and not following 
it, she cannot guarantee that she is following the rule in the 
right way. This point is explicitly stated by Wittgenstein: 
“Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise 
thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as 
obeying it” (Wittgenstein, 1953, § 202). So, where do rules or 
norms come from? Don’t they come from the agents that 
establish them? Sure, but this is not the same as saying that a 
solitary agent could be involved in the process of establishing 
a rule. Norms can only emerge within a social context. 
Rule-establishing cannot be a private exercise, but what 
about norm-following? The enactivist claims: “even if the 
origin of some norms does not fully lie within the individual 
(e.g., social norms) it is always the individual who internalizes 
them” (Barandiaran et al., 2009, p. 6). What sort of process 
could this internalization be? For the purpose of answering 
this question, let’s rescue another classic example from 
Wittgenstein, that of the beetle in the box (Wittgenstein, 1953, 
§ 293). Let’s assume that everyone in their own case knows 
how to follow a rule because they have internalized it. Each of 
us would walk around carrying a box and calling what is 
inside ‘a beetle’ — or, better, ‘a norm’. Nobody can see inside 
anyone else’s box, and everyone knows what a beetle (or a 
norm) is only through looking inside their own boxes. On the 
other hand, we all know how to use the concept ‘beetle’ or 
‘norm’. Suppose that in fact we all have different things in our 
boxes (or even imagine that there is nothing at all in them). 
The key point here is that the object in the box plays no role at 
all in our understanding of how to use the concept. In the 
same vein, we do not need to look inside us or appeal to any 
inner state to know what following a rule is. The criteria are 
outside the individual; they are located in the social 
community. They are shared. But they are not objects. We do 
not need to look for them as if they were part of our internal 
machinery. This is why norms are not individual-internal, but 
social-external processes, both when they are established and 
when they are followed. Being goal-oriented and having 
conditions of success and failure is necessary but not 
sufficient for being normative. Normativity also demands 
awareness of the possibility of error, training, habit and social 
learning.  
Conclusions and further work 
In this paper we have offered three inter-related arguments 
against enactivism’s insistence on talking about norms at the 
level of simple, non-social agents: (1) the co-emergence of 
individuality and normativity is just taken for granted because 
the claim that these are mutually supporting ideas is viciously 
circular. A robust notion of agency related to an evolutionary 
history of adaptation and selection is sufficient to account for 
the singularity of living systems. (2) A notion of normativity 
as vague as the one offered by the enactive theory blurs the 
distinction between dispositional, individual, intrinsic natural 
processes and the social, external and institutional ones that 
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can inhibit the former group. A clear separation between 
phenomena defined by mere conditions of success and failure 
and phenomena characterized by correctness conditions 
makes explicit such a distinction. (3) The concept ‘norm’ can 
only be applied to what enactivists call ‘social norms’: the 
Wittgensteinian discussion of rule-following shows that there 
is something deeply paradoxical in thinking of the behaviour 
of an agent considered in isolation as being governed by 
norms. As usual, we should not be led to confusion by 
etymology: full-blown normativity and self-regulated 
behaviour are to be distinguished. A single agent cannot 
establish a rule because it is acting according to its 
dispositions; acting according to one’s dispositions and acting 
according to a rule are not the same thing; and, finally, there is 
no need to appeal to any internalization of the norm to explain 
how agents follow them.  
The behaviour of a cell is manifestly suitable for 
explanation in dispositional terms, because it cannot be 
divorced from its environment. We can say that its behaviour 
is rich enough to qualify it as ‘goal-directed’. But it is not 
normative because there is no socially-established norm that 
could inhibit any of the cell’s intrinsic dispositions. Inasmuch 
as the criteria of correctness of that hypothetical norm are not 
shared, the cell could not possibly distinguish between 
instances when it is acting according to the norm and 
instances when it is not. Neither could we: the distinction 
between failure due to the cell’s behaviour and failure due to, 
say, a hostile environment cannot be made for actions that are 
mere manifestations of dispositions. Our claim is that a cell’s 
behaviour may be insufficient to guarantee its survival in 
some environment, but that such failure does not entitle us to 
consider the behaviour incorrect. This is why the only wrong 
cell is the dead one. 
Our qualms with enactivism’s excessively liberal use of 
normative considerations is no obstacle to our sympathy with 
enactivism’s anti-representationalist commitments, as well as 
its emphasis on embodiment, situatedness, the active character 
of perception, and the centrality of the agent as a whole. We 
also agree that perceptual relations with the environment can 
be explained by means of looping processes. However, we 
think that this anti-representational approach to cognition is 
better developed by ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979). 
Gibsonians gave an account of perception in a way that is 
much more externalist, biosemiotic, and structure-independent 
than the sensorimotor contingencies defended by the enactive 
view. This is the reason why ecological psychology has 
provided a better account of learning than enactivism, even 
though they start with the same anti-representational 
assumptions (Jacobs and Michaels, 2007). Enactivism is too 
closely focused on the internal structure of the organism and 
concedes too little attention to the explanatory role that the 
environment plays with respect to perception and action. We 
also depart from the enactivists regarding their faith in 
autopoiesis being the best explanation of every aspect of 
biological processes: from the emergence of agency to the 
emergence of perception.  We also do not see autopoiesis as 
being the best explanatory framework for processes such as 
adaptation and cognition. In fact, as we have seen, the 
enactive, co-emergent explanation consists in subsuming all 
biological processes into just one: the recursive loop made by 
all systems of every organism. This may well be the best 
answer to the question of how all organisms are able to 
maintain their stability through time, but that does not amount 
to defining agency, adaptation, cognition and the rest of the 
set of biological processes at once. Take the example of 
adaptation, a process the enactivists sometimes call 
‘adaptivity’ (Maturana and Varela, 1984; Di Paolo, 2005). 
This process is based on the recursive loop we have 
mentioned, and we can apply the same logic of recursivity to 
the relations of the agent with the environment: an adaptive 
capacity is one that is able to regulate its relation with the 
environment in order to keep the agent within a state of 
viability. Organisms can detect tendencies in which the agent 
approaches (or recedes from) the boundary of viability. As 
any biologist would concede, this formulation is insufficient 
to account for adaptation in the full sense. Adaptation is a trait 
that contributes to the fitness and survival of individuals but it 
also needs to be explained as the result of processes of natural 
selection, and reference eventually needs to be made to 
species and populations (Darwin, 1859; Huxley, 1942; 
Williams, 1966; Mayr, 1983). If we want to give a full 
account of why an agent is adapted, we necessarily need to 
appeal to its evolutionary history and talk about how natural 
selection works. This is a question answered only at the 
macroscopic level and by means of reverse engineering 
(Dennett, 1995), not by looking at the looping processes of 
individual agents. We think that the excessive emphasis on the 
logic of looping processes is leading enactivism towards an 
underestimation of natural selection, the role of populations, 
and the different levels of explanation involved. Not all 
questions in biology are answered by redirecting the answer to 
the looping processes of self-sustenance of individual agents. 
Some questions (why a trait has evolved this way rather than 
that way, why we have perceptual system at all, etc.) are 
answered by appealing to the supra-agential realm and this 
means by appealing to how natural selection works. Whereas 
other questions (how do we perceive, etc.) are answered 
appealing to looping processes (ecological, perception-action 
loops). There are different questions addressed by different 
levels of explanation. We do not think, as enactive theorists 
seem to endorse, that all biological processes can be explained 
by means of their looping and co-emergent logic and by 
appealing to the autopoiesis of individuals.  
We think that this philosophical discussion is clearly of 
interest for computer scientists for two very important 
reasons: it is important not to confuse levels of analysis and 
also not to misattribute properties or predicates to agents that 
do not fulfill the right criteria of application. An unicellular 
agent cannot be wrong because there is no room for norms in 
its behaviour. For following a norm some conditions are 
needed: (1) a community, (2) the possibility to err, (3) 
correction criteria for the right application of a concept or a 
right way of behaving in a certain context, (4) the possibility 
to differentiate between following a norm and thinking that 
one is following a norm, (5) to be sanctioned by a community 
in order to understand which are these criteria and how to 
differentiate between what one thought she was doing when 
following a rule and what she was really doing. Even when a 
Wittgensteinian strategy is not committed to offer necessary 
and sufficient conditions for defining a concept, these 
previous points can summarize more or less some features that 
are common to any notion of ‘norm’. We think that, 
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summarized in the previous points, a computer scientist does 
not offer anything new when he claims that a unicellular 
isolated agent can follow norms. That claim only shows that, 
even when he could design a really good model, the scientist 
never got the conceptual point of what a norm is.  Even 
though it is surely possible to describe all of the different 
levels of agency from a naturalistic viewpoint (making use of 
our best empirical evidence from the biological sciences), 
introducing the most complex concepts, such as ‘normativity’, 
when studying the most primitive forms of agency is not a 
good strategy. A better strategy would be to focus on what 
have been called the ‘major transitions in evolution’ (Maynard 
Smith and Szathmáry, 1995); that is, to focus on the 
conditions under which new organizational levels appear 
rather than taking them for granted. Unlike enactivism, we 
reject the idea that the naturalization of normativity can be 
made by normativizing nature: all that is rational is real, but 
not all that is real is rational. 
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